ci(security): phase-1 CI hardening — affected-area tests, least privilege, action pinning, dependency governance (#336 )

* ci(security): run deterministic eval tests in affected-area CI (Task 04)

The build-check job validated build + suite structure but never ran the
tests, and its summary referenced a `test:ci` script that did not exist.
Make affected-area CI meaningful:

- Add `test:ci` to evals/framework running the offline, deterministic
  Vitest allowlist (7 files / 112 tests) — no model, network, or paid
  execution.
- Add a required "Run deterministic tests" step to build-check; a failure
  fails the job and the existing PR summary gate (which keys on
  build-check.result) fails closed.
- Correct the summary note to state test:ci runs the deterministic
  allowlist and that model/network agent suites are excluded on PRs.

The broader deterministic suite has 3 pre-existing failing files
(framework-confidence, logger, test-runner; confirmed failing before this
work) which are intentionally out of the allowlist and tracked separately.

Validated locally: build, validate:suites:all, and test:ci all exit 0.

* ci(security): least privilege permissions + pin actions to SHAs (Task 05)

Harden all 9 GitHub Actions workflows:

Least privilege:
- Add explicit top-level `permissions: contents: read` to installer-checks,
  validate-test-suites, and opencode (opencode's job keeps the writes it
  needs; the top level now defaults to read).
- Every workflow now declares an explicit top-level permissions block.
- Write scopes retained only where justified (releases, doc/registry
  commits, follow-up PRs, and sync-docs' issues.create).

Immutable action pinning:
- Pin every `uses:` to a full 40-char commit SHA with a version comment,
  including first-party actions/* (checkout, github-script, setup-node,
  upload-artifact) and third-party (oven-sh/setup-bun).
- Replace the two mutable refs that could change under us at any push:
  ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master and sst/opencode/github@latest.

Record all SHAs, versions, and permission justifications in
docs/maintenance/repository-recovery/action-pin-inventory.md.

Verified: all 9 workflows parse as valid YAML; no floating tag/branch refs
remain; every workflow has a top-level permissions block.

* docs(security): add SECURITY.md and private-reporting checklist (Task 06)

- Add root SECURITY.md: supported versions (0.7.x), private reporting via
  GitHub's "Report a vulnerability", best-effort response expectations,
  coordinated disclosure, and no-secret guidance.
- Add private-vulnerability-reporting checklist that separates repository
  file work (this PR) from GitHub settings changes that require their own
  approval (Task 07: enabling private vulnerability reporting).

No external links to validate; the reporting path uses the repo Security
tab. SECURITY.md documents the private reporting path ahead of Task 07
enabling it.

* ci(security): add dependency governance and ownership controls (Task 08)

- .github/dependabot.yml: weekly grouped github-actions updates (keeps the
  Task 05 SHA pins current). Scoped to actions only — the primary lockfile
  is bun.lock and Dependabot's npm ecosystem would desync it; npm
  dependency risk is covered by dependency-review below.
- .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml: runs on PRs with contents: read,
  SHA-pinned actions, fail-on-severity: high to block newly introduced
  high-severity vulnerabilities (exceptions documented inline).
- .github/CODEOWNERS: default owner @darrenhinde with explicit ownership of
  security-sensitive paths (workflows, dependabot, CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md,
  scripts/validation).

Verified: dependabot.yml and dependency-review.yml are valid YAML;
dependency-review actions are SHA-pinned with contents: read; CODEOWNERS
owner is the repository owner.

* docs(security): record GitHub security settings evidence (Task 07)

Enable private vulnerability reporting and record read-back evidence.

Settings changed (each approved immediately before, verified by read-back):
- Private vulnerability reporting: enabled=false -> enabled=true. The
  Security tab now offers "Report a vulnerability", making the path
  documented in SECURITY.md live.
- Dependency Graph / Dependabot alerts: 404 -> 204. This was an
  undocumented prerequisite of Task 08's dependency-review.yml, which
  failed with "Dependency graph is not enabled"; the Dependency Review
  check on PR #336 went fail -> pass after enabling it.

No other repository setting was modified; secret scanning and push
protection are unchanged, and dependabot_security_updates remains disabled
(out of scope, would need its own approval). Both changes are reversible
via the corresponding DELETE calls.

Marks Part B of the private-vulnerability-reporting checklist complete.

2026-07-15 00:19:28 +01:00

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Raw Blame History

GitHub Actions Pin & Permissions Inventory

Repository-recovery Task 05 — least privilege + immutable action pinning. Resolved: 2026-07-15.

Third-party / external action pins

Every uses: reference is pinned to a full 40-character commit SHA, with the human-readable version retained as a trailing comment. SHAs were resolved via gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<ref> on the date above.

Action	Previous ref	Pinned SHA	Note
`actions/checkout`	`@v4` (19 uses)	`34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5`	GitHub-owned
`actions/github-script`	`@v7` (6 uses)	`f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b`	GitHub-owned
`actions/setup-node`	`@v4` (3 uses)	`49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020`	GitHub-owned
`actions/upload-artifact`	`@v4` (1 use)	`ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02`	GitHub-owned
`oven-sh/setup-bun`	`@v2` (1 use)	`0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6`	Matches the SHA already pinned by the other usage
`ludeeus/action-shellcheck`	`@master` (1 use)	`00b27aa7cb85167568cb48a3838b75f4265f2bca`	Was a mutable branch ref — highest risk before pinning
`sst/opencode/github`	`@latest` (1 use)	`77fc88c8ade8e5a620ebbe1197f3a572d29ae91a`	Was a mutable ref — freezes the OpenCode agent version; update deliberately

Update guidance

To bump a pinned action later: re-resolve the desired tag to its SHA (gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/commits/<tag> --jq .sha), replace the SHA, and update the trailing version comment in the same edit. Never revert a pin back to a floating tag or branch.

Workflow permissions (least privilege)

Every workflow now declares an explicit top-level permissions: block. Default is contents: read; write scopes remain only where a job demonstrably needs them.

Workflow	Top-level	Job-level writes	Justification
`pr-checks.yml`	`contents: read`	—	read-only validation
`validate-registry.yml`	`contents: read`	—	read-only validation
`installer-checks.yml`	`contents: read` (added)	—	shellcheck / installer tests, read-only
`validate-test-suites.yml`	`contents: read` (added)	—	suite validation, read-only
`opencode.yml`	`contents: read` (added)	`id-token`, `contents`, `pull-requests`, `issues: write` (job)	`/oc` agent, gated to OWNER/MEMBER; job needs write to act on PRs/issues
`create-release.yml`	`contents: write`	—	creates tags/releases
`post-merge-pr.yml`	`contents: write`, `pull-requests: write`	—	opens follow-up PRs
`sync-docs.yml`	`contents: write`, `pull-requests: write`, `issues: write`	—	commits doc branch, opens PR, creates a sync issue (`issues.create`)
`update-registry.yml`	`contents: write`	—	commits registry updates

issues: write in sync-docs.yml is retained because the workflow calls github.rest.issues.create to open a sync-tracking issue.

Verification

All 9 workflow files parse as valid YAML.
No uses: reference remains on a floating tag or branch — all are 40-char SHAs.
Every workflow has an explicit top-level permissions: block.

3.2 KiB Raw Blame History