Document the D-043 deployment: the browser -> Zoraxy (10.1.0.10, TLS) -> app (0.0.0.0:8080, http) topology, the config.yaml, the Zoraxy ProxyHost headers (X-Forwarded-For + X-Forwarded-Proto), the firewall rule, the tunnel-only bootstrap, systemd, and the misconfig warnings. - config.example.yaml: trusted_proxies: ["10.1.0.10"] with the silent-failure and firewall caveats. - deploy/myday.service: the systemd unit (Type=simple, Restart=on-failure, User/WorkingDirectory/ExecStart, After=network-online.target). - docs/deploy-zoraxy.md: the full walkthrough. - README.md: the Deployment section points at the guide. Docs/deploy only — no code change.
206 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
206 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
# Deploying MyDay behind Zoraxy
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> **Status:** the reference deployment for **D-043**. The app is never the TLS
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> endpoint; **[Zoraxy](https://github.com/tobychui/zoraxy) terminates TLS** and
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> relays plain HTTP to the app. This document is operator-facing — it changes no
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> code. The decision of record is `PROJECT_PLAN.md` **D-043** / **D-025 (revised)**;
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> the gate's behaviour is `docs/specs/spec-003-core-door.md` **§7**.
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---
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## 1. Topology
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```
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browser ──https──▶ Zoraxy 10.1.0.10 ──http──▶ app 0.0.0.0:8080
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(TLS public) terminates TLS (plain HTTP, trusted proxy)
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sets X-Forwarded-For
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+ X-Forwarded-Proto
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```
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- **Zoraxy** — `10.1.0.10`, holds the certificate for `myday.sechpoint.app`,
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terminates TLS, and forwards to the app over plain HTTP.
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- **App** — listens on `0.0.0.0:8080` over **HTTP** (`server.listen`). Because the
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app is not the TLS endpoint it must **honour the proxy's `X-Forwarded-Proto`** to
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know a request arrived over `https` (that is what turns on the `Secure` +
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`__Host-` session cookie and HSTS).
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- **Firewall** — `:8080` is reachable **only from `10.1.0.10`** (see §4). The port
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is the app's whole attack surface: anything that can reach it bypasses both
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Zoraxy **and its TLS**.
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---
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## 2. The app config (`config.yaml`)
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Copy `config.example.yaml` → `config.yaml` (gitignored — **never commit it**, D-010)
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and set the three server keys:
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```yaml
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server:
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listen: "0.0.0.0:8080"
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base_url: "https://myday.sechpoint.app" # the PUBLIC origin (invite / recovery links)
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trusted_proxies:
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- "10.1.0.10" # Zoraxy
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```
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- **`listen`** — any bind is allowed (there is **no** setup-mode bind refusal,
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D-025 revised). Bind `0.0.0.0:8080`; the firewall narrows who can reach it.
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- **`base_url`** — the public origin. It is the host the browser actually visits,
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so it must be `https://` (WebAuthn derives its Relying Party ID from it).
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- **`trusted_proxies`** — the peers whose `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Forwarded-Proto`
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are honoured (A6/D-043).
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> **It must be the address Zoraxy connects *from*, not the public hostname.**
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> `trusted_proxies` matches the **TCP peer** of the app's connection. With Zoraxy
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> on `10.1.0.10`, that peer is `10.1.0.10`. (If Zoraxy ran on the *same* host you
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> would use `127.0.0.1` instead — that is the only case where loopback is right.)
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---
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## 3. The Zoraxy ProxyHost
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Create a **Proxy Host** (reverse proxy rule) in Zoraxy:
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| Field | Value |
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| Domain / hostname | `myday.sechpoint.app` |
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| TLS | on (Zoraxy's certificate for that host) |
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| Upstream / target | `http://<app-host>:8080` (plain HTTP) |
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| `X-Forwarded-For` | **set / forwarded** |
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| `X-Forwarded-Proto` | **set / forwarded** (`https`) |
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Zoraxy sets `X-Forwarded-For` on a normal HTTP proxy rule; confirm it **and**
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`X-Forwarded-Proto` in the rule's header settings, then verify end-to-end (§7).
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The app deliberately **requires** both:
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- `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` is what makes the session cookie `Secure`
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(`__Host-myday_session`) and adds HSTS (AC-13).
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- The **absence of `X-Forwarded-For`** is the proof the setup gate uses that a
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request is the direct SSH tunnel, not a proxy relay (§6, D-025 revised).
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---
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## 4. Firewall — lock `:8080` to Zoraxy
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Allow `:8080/tcp` **only** from `10.1.0.10`.
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**ufw:**
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```bash
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ufw allow from 10.1.0.10 to any port 8080 proto tcp
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# the default incoming policy (deny) drops every other source
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```
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**nftables:**
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```nft
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table inet myday_guard {
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chain input {
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type filter hook input priority filter; policy accept;
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tcp dport 8080 ip saddr != 10.1.0.10 drop
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}
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}
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```
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> If you run a host firewall, this rule is the load-bearing one: without it the
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> app's plain-HTTP port is directly reachable and its TLS hardening (cookie
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> `Secure`, HSTS, the tunnel gate) is bypassed.
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---
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## 5. Tunnel-only bootstrap (before the first admin exists)
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The **first user becomes the top admin**, so the initial `/setup` wizard is served
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**only over a direct SSH tunnel** — never through the proxy. This is enforced
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**per request** (D-025 revised / SPEC-003 §7): in setup mode the app serves a
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request **only** if its **TCP peer is loopback *and* it carries no
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`X-Forwarded-For`** — i.e. the tunnel. Everything else is **404**.
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```bash
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# from your workstation — tunnel to the app's loopback port on the server
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ssh -L 8080:127.0.0.1:8080 <user>@<app-host>
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# then, in a browser on your workstation:
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# http://127.0.0.1:8080/setup
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```
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- Open the app over **`localhost` / `127.0.0.1`** — a loopback origin is the only
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one the browser treats as a secure context for **WebAuthn** dialogs.
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- The wizard creates the top admin (**Passkey + TOTP**; the TOTP secret is sealed
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with the generated `totp_encryption_key`) and writes `config.yaml`
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(`setup: false`, the base URL, mail/locale, and the secrets).
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- A proxy **cannot** reach a fresh instance: even a same-host proxy presents a
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loopback peer but always adds `X-Forwarded-For`, which gives it away → 404.
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### The restart — adopting the persisted secrets
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The **secrets are generated at startup** while any value is still `CHANGE_ME…`
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(so the wizard's ceremony is never signed with a shipped, public key). The wizard
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then **persists those same values** into `config.yaml`. So once setup is complete:
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```bash
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sudo systemctl restart myday
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```
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The restart **adopts the written `config.yaml`** — the generated keys are now on
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disk, so the admin's TOTP secret (sealed with that key) keeps working. **Boot the
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productive instance from the written `config.yaml`, never from
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`config.example.yaml`** (its placeholders fail closed in productive mode by
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design). After the restart, `/setup` is **404** and the app serves normally.
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---
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## 6. systemd
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Build, install the unit, and start it. The unit is
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[`deploy/myday.service`](../deploy/myday.service) — replace every `<PLACEHOLDER>`:
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```bash
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# 1. build the static, CGO-free binary
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go build -trimpath -o /usr/local/bin/myday ./cmd/myday
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# 2. the app dir holds config.yaml and data/ (SQLite)
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install -d -o <myday-user> -g <myday-group> /opt/myday
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install -m 0640 -o <myday-user> -g <myday-group> config.yaml /opt/myday/config.yaml
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# 3. the unit
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install -m 0644 deploy/myday.service /etc/systemd/system/myday.service
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systemctl daemon-reload
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systemctl enable --now myday
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journalctl -u myday -f
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```
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The unit sets `WorkingDirectory=` to the app dir (where `config.yaml` and `data/`
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live), `User=`, `ExecStart=<binary>`, and `After=network-online.target`; see the
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file's header comment for the placeholders.
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---
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## 7. Verify, and the misconfig warnings
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```bash
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# from anywhere — the public origin
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curl -sI https://myday.sechpoint.app/ | grep -i '^strict-transport-security'
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# expect: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=… (HSTS — proves X-Forwarded-Proto was honoured)
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```
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| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
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| Session cookie has **no `Secure`**, **no `__Host-`** prefix, and **no HSTS** | `trusted_proxies` is **empty or wrong**, so `X-Forwarded-Proto` is ignored (fails *silently*) | Set `server.trusted_proxies: ["10.1.0.10"]` and restart |
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| Client IP in the audit log is the **proxy**, not the user | same — `X-Forwarded-For` is not trusted | as above |
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| `/` and `/home` return **404** while bootstrapping | **by design** — in setup mode only `/setup` (and static assets) is served | complete the wizard; the app serves normally once productive |
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| `/setup` returns **404** even via the proxy | **by design** — the gate is tunnel-only | bootstrap over the SSH tunnel (§5), *then* expose it |
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> **The load-bearing deployment requirement:** Zoraxy **must set
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> `X-Forwarded-For`**. The setup gate's "no XFF ⇒ it's the tunnel" test depends on
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> it, and a missing header would re-open first-visitor-wins. `X-Forwarded-Proto`
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> is what keeps the cookie `Secure` over the proxy.
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---
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## See also
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| [`PROJECT_PLAN.md`](../PROJECT_PLAN.md) | D-043 · D-025 (revised) |
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| [`docs/specs/spec-003-core-door.md`](specs/spec-003-core-door.md) | §7 the loopback/setup gate · §9 AC-7 / AC-10 / AC-13 |
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| [`config.example.yaml`](../config.example.yaml) | the commented config template |
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| [`deploy/myday.service`](../deploy/myday.service) | the systemd unit |
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