REVIEW-001 (M0) perimeter findings:
- H1: resolveForwarded walked X-Forwarded-For left→right and returned the
leftmost untrusted entry. An append-style proxy (nginx's default) appends
the peer it saw to the RIGHT of whatever the client sent, so the leftmost
entry is attacker-controlled — a fresh rate-limit bucket per request (A3)
and a forged client_ip in the audit trail (A11/D-031). Walk right→left and
return the first untrusted entry, falling back to the peer.
- L1s: the session cookie now carries the `__Host-` prefix when it is Secure
(https), so it is pinned to the exact origin and cannot be shadowed from a
sibling subdomain. Conditional on purpose: a browser rejects a `__Host-`
cookie without Secure, which would break the http loopback bootstrap.
- L4s: add Permissions-Policy, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy and
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy.
- Add httpx.IsLoopbackIP: a RESOLVED client IP test that fails closed on an
empty/unparseable value (the setup-mode gate, H2), sharing a classifier
with IsLoopbackHost whose "unknown" direction is the opposite, each
fail-closed for its own decision.
Tests updated: the unit test encoding the vulnerable leftmost expectation is
rewritten, plus right→left/forged-entry/host-classification coverage.
Wires the door: config → store → migrations → the discovered module registry →
nav into the shell → the reserved `static` workflow → serve. Generates the TOTP
sealing key at startup in setup mode (SPEC-009 D-1) so the wizard's TOTP
enrollment precedes Finish. Fails closed on a bad module set.
- One base layout (layout.html) with the header, the nav from Registry.Nav()
(D-038), a content slot and the CSRF token; every page renders inside it and
a module supplies content only
- Embedded same-origin assets (app.css · app.js · webauthn.js · sw.js ·
manifest.webmanifest · icons) served by the reserved `static` workflow
- webauthn.js drives the three ceremonies from data-* attributes — no inline
script, so the CSP `script-src 'self'` holds (AC-3)
- manifest start_url "/" (D-011); the service worker never caches an
authenticated response or /{GUID} (A5)
- Build-time discovery (D-028, the Caddy pattern): a module self-registers from
init(); internal/modules/imports_gen.go (go:generate) blank-imports every
module directory, so THE DIRECTORY IS THE SOURCE OF TRUTH
- The registry: deterministic registration order, config-backed enable/disable
(D-038), required modules, name-prefixed migrations, Mount() into the door
- The name-collision guard now also fails a module named for a reserved
level-1 workflow (SPEC-009 §13 Q-1) — access · static · api · media · ws ·
dev — derived from routing.ReservedWorkflows, `home` excepted (D-2)
- home: the reference dashboard module, and the core Modules page
Reserved, setup-mode-only, loopback-only: the domain, the top admin, the
authenticator (TOTP), mail/locale — then Finish persists and the dashboard
becomes reachable. The wizard IS the bootstrap (D-026); the TOTP key is
generated at startup so TOTP enrollment precedes Finish (SPEC-009 D-1).
- webauthn: the passkey ceremony service (a fake in tests)
- totp: the TOTP authenticator; the secret is AEAD-sealed at rest (A9)
- sealer: the AEAD TOTP sealer
- identities/sessions/credentials: the GUID state machine
- flow: the enroll/login screens + the passkey nudge (pre-session
double-submit CSRF — A15), rendered inside the shell
- store: SQLite (WAL, foreign keys ON, CGO-free driver) + the embedded
migration runner; each module's migrations are name-prefixed (D-012)
- audit: the append-only audit log; the actor threads via context (R-1)
- users: the user_id/GUID/email anchors (D-013)
- config: the YAML settings file (D-035) + validation
- httpx: cookies · loopback detection · trusted-proxy XFF · CSRF · security
headers · redaction
- middleware: correlation id · audit · rate limiting
- mail: the invite/recovery mailer seam
- server: the core DOOR — the resolution switch, the dispatch registry
(RegisterModule), the role gates, /setup · enroll/login · recovery flows,
the reserved `static` workflow, and the loopback-only bootstrap (D-025)
Turns a request path plus the two routing fields (`do`/`action`) into a single
Resolution for BOTH doors (D-039): the RESERVED level-1 switch first
(home/access/setup/api/static/media/ws/dev — D-004), then the GUID classifier,
then the registry. Identity and the module registry are injected interfaces, so
the package is PURE — no HTTP stack, no DB (asserted by purity_test.go). All 22
spec rows are covered.
The bare `myday` pattern matched any path component named `myday`, including
the `cmd/myday/` source directory — so `cmd/myday/main.go` (the entrypoint)
could never be committed and a fresh clone would not build. Anchor it to the
repo root (`/myday`); the built binary still falls out of git.
- PROJECT_PLAN.md: the decision log of record through D-042 and the M0.1 slice
- docs/specs: SPEC-002…009 — routing · door · identity/sessions · /setup ·
enroll/login · roles/chain/recovery · module registry · the web layer & PWA
(plus docs/specs/README.md, the index)
- AGENT.md: the working rules — commit AND push at every submilestone (gate
green), Conventional Commits, never commit secrets
- README.md: the quickstart, the first-run/SSH-tunnel steps and the
localhost/loopback caveat (SPEC-009 §13 Q-3): with an https base URL the
CSRF/session cookies are Secure, so reach the app at localhost/127.0.0.1
- config.example.yaml: the settings template (D-035)
