699b2d7769
* ci(security): run deterministic eval tests in affected-area CI (Task 04) The build-check job validated build + suite structure but never ran the tests, and its summary referenced a `test:ci` script that did not exist. Make affected-area CI meaningful: - Add `test:ci` to evals/framework running the offline, deterministic Vitest allowlist (7 files / 112 tests) — no model, network, or paid execution. - Add a required "Run deterministic tests" step to build-check; a failure fails the job and the existing PR summary gate (which keys on build-check.result) fails closed. - Correct the summary note to state test:ci runs the deterministic allowlist and that model/network agent suites are excluded on PRs. The broader deterministic suite has 3 pre-existing failing files (framework-confidence, logger, test-runner; confirmed failing before this work) which are intentionally out of the allowlist and tracked separately. Validated locally: build, validate:suites:all, and test:ci all exit 0. * ci(security): least privilege permissions + pin actions to SHAs (Task 05) Harden all 9 GitHub Actions workflows: Least privilege: - Add explicit top-level `permissions: contents: read` to installer-checks, validate-test-suites, and opencode (opencode's job keeps the writes it needs; the top level now defaults to read). - Every workflow now declares an explicit top-level permissions block. - Write scopes retained only where justified (releases, doc/registry commits, follow-up PRs, and sync-docs' issues.create). Immutable action pinning: - Pin every `uses:` to a full 40-char commit SHA with a version comment, including first-party actions/* (checkout, github-script, setup-node, upload-artifact) and third-party (oven-sh/setup-bun). - Replace the two mutable refs that could change under us at any push: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master and sst/opencode/github@latest. Record all SHAs, versions, and permission justifications in docs/maintenance/repository-recovery/action-pin-inventory.md. Verified: all 9 workflows parse as valid YAML; no floating tag/branch refs remain; every workflow has a top-level permissions block. * docs(security): add SECURITY.md and private-reporting checklist (Task 06) - Add root SECURITY.md: supported versions (0.7.x), private reporting via GitHub's "Report a vulnerability", best-effort response expectations, coordinated disclosure, and no-secret guidance. - Add private-vulnerability-reporting checklist that separates repository file work (this PR) from GitHub settings changes that require their own approval (Task 07: enabling private vulnerability reporting). No external links to validate; the reporting path uses the repo Security tab. SECURITY.md documents the private reporting path ahead of Task 07 enabling it. * ci(security): add dependency governance and ownership controls (Task 08) - .github/dependabot.yml: weekly grouped github-actions updates (keeps the Task 05 SHA pins current). Scoped to actions only — the primary lockfile is bun.lock and Dependabot's npm ecosystem would desync it; npm dependency risk is covered by dependency-review below. - .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml: runs on PRs with contents: read, SHA-pinned actions, fail-on-severity: high to block newly introduced high-severity vulnerabilities (exceptions documented inline). - .github/CODEOWNERS: default owner @darrenhinde with explicit ownership of security-sensitive paths (workflows, dependabot, CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md, scripts/validation). Verified: dependabot.yml and dependency-review.yml are valid YAML; dependency-review actions are SHA-pinned with contents: read; CODEOWNERS owner is the repository owner. * docs(security): record GitHub security settings evidence (Task 07) Enable private vulnerability reporting and record read-back evidence. Settings changed (each approved immediately before, verified by read-back): - Private vulnerability reporting: enabled=false -> enabled=true. The Security tab now offers "Report a vulnerability", making the path documented in SECURITY.md live. - Dependency Graph / Dependabot alerts: 404 -> 204. This was an undocumented prerequisite of Task 08's dependency-review.yml, which failed with "Dependency graph is not enabled"; the Dependency Review check on PR #336 went fail -> pass after enabling it. No other repository setting was modified; secret scanning and push protection are unchanged, and dependabot_security_updates remains disabled (out of scope, would need its own approval). Both changes are reversible via the corresponding DELETE calls. Marks Part B of the private-vulnerability-reporting checklist complete.
87 lines
3.1 KiB
YAML
87 lines
3.1 KiB
YAML
name: Validate Registry on PR
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# Contributor code must run only with a read-only token and no secrets.
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# Never change this workflow back to pull_request_target while it checks out
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# and executes pull-request code.
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on:
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pull_request:
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branches:
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- main
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- dev
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workflow_dispatch:
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permissions:
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contents: read
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jobs:
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validate-and-update:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 10
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steps:
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- name: Checkout code without persisted credentials
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uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
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with:
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fetch-depth: 0
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persist-credentials: false
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- name: Install system dependencies
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run: |
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sudo apt-get update
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sudo apt-get install -y jq
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- name: Install Bun
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uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2
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with:
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bun-version: latest
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- name: Install project dependencies
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run: bun install --frozen-lockfile
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- name: Make validation scripts executable
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run: |
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chmod +x scripts/registry/validate-registry.sh
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chmod +x scripts/registry/auto-detect-components.sh
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chmod +x scripts/registry/register-component.sh
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chmod +x scripts/prompts/validate-pr.sh
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- name: Report registry drift
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id: registry_drift
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run: |
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./scripts/registry/auto-detect-components.sh --dry-run > /tmp/detect-output.txt 2>&1
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cat /tmp/detect-output.txt
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sed $'s/\033\\[[0-9;]*m//g' /tmp/detect-output.txt > /tmp/detect-output-plain.txt
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if grep -Eq 'New Components:[[:space:]]*[1-9][0-9]*([[:space:]]|$)' /tmp/detect-output-plain.txt; then
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echo "drift_detected=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
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echo "## Registry drift detected" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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echo "The repository already contains components not represented in registry.json." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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echo "This is reported but does not block security validation until the existing drift is reconciled." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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else
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echo "drift_detected=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
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fi
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- name: Validate prompt library structure
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run: ./scripts/prompts/validate-pr.sh
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- name: Validate markdown context links
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run: npm run validate:context-links
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- name: Validate registry
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run: npm run validate:registry
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- name: Validation summary
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if: success()
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run: |
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echo "## All registry validations passed" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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echo "- Prompt library structure is valid" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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echo "- Context markdown links are valid" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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echo "- Registry paths and dependencies are valid" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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if [ "${{ steps.registry_drift.outputs.drift_detected }}" = "true" ]; then
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echo "- Existing registry drift was reported separately" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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else
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echo "- No unregistered components were detected" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
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fi
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