Evidence-based validation of the hardened workflows (no GitHub test state
created; no branch or worktree created or deleted). All six fork-safety
claims were independently re-derived and CONFIRMED:
- No live pull_request_target trigger (the only match is Task 02's warning
comment; validate-registry.yml parses to pull_request + workflow_dispatch).
- Fork-reachable surface is exactly 5 workflows, each with top-level
contents: read and no job-level override.
- Zero secret references in any fork-reachable workflow.
- Every secret-bearing workflow is unreachable from a fork (push /
workflow_dispatch, or issue_comment gated to OWNER/MEMBER).
- Internal validation: PR #334's failed Build & Validate blocked the PR
Checks Summary (exit 1); #336's 7 checks all executed and passed.
Gaps found and closed:
- Add persist-credentials: false to the 7 checkouts missing it
(installer-checks 6, validate-test-suites 1), so all 11 checkouts across
the fork-reachable surface now avoid persisting the token to .git/config.
- Remove validate-test-suites.yml's failure-path PR comment step. It called
issues.createComment, which needs issues: write. This was a regression
introduced by Task 05: the workflow previously had no permissions block
and inherited the repository's write default, so the step worked; adding
the correct contents: read broke it. Deleted rather than granting write to
a fork-reachable workflow — for fork PRs GitHub forces a read-only token,
so the step could never work there anyway. Failures stay visible via the
red check and the uploaded report.
Repository setting changed (approved, read-back verified, recorded in the
doc): default_workflow_permissions write -> read and
can_approve_pull_request_reviews true -> false, so future workflows without
an explicit permissions block default to read-only. No current workflow
relied on the write default.
* ci(security): run deterministic eval tests in affected-area CI (Task 04)
The build-check job validated build + suite structure but never ran the
tests, and its summary referenced a `test:ci` script that did not exist.
Make affected-area CI meaningful:
- Add `test:ci` to evals/framework running the offline, deterministic
Vitest allowlist (7 files / 112 tests) — no model, network, or paid
execution.
- Add a required "Run deterministic tests" step to build-check; a failure
fails the job and the existing PR summary gate (which keys on
build-check.result) fails closed.
- Correct the summary note to state test:ci runs the deterministic
allowlist and that model/network agent suites are excluded on PRs.
The broader deterministic suite has 3 pre-existing failing files
(framework-confidence, logger, test-runner; confirmed failing before this
work) which are intentionally out of the allowlist and tracked separately.
Validated locally: build, validate:suites:all, and test:ci all exit 0.
* ci(security): least privilege permissions + pin actions to SHAs (Task 05)
Harden all 9 GitHub Actions workflows:
Least privilege:
- Add explicit top-level `permissions: contents: read` to installer-checks,
validate-test-suites, and opencode (opencode's job keeps the writes it
needs; the top level now defaults to read).
- Every workflow now declares an explicit top-level permissions block.
- Write scopes retained only where justified (releases, doc/registry
commits, follow-up PRs, and sync-docs' issues.create).
Immutable action pinning:
- Pin every `uses:` to a full 40-char commit SHA with a version comment,
including first-party actions/* (checkout, github-script, setup-node,
upload-artifact) and third-party (oven-sh/setup-bun).
- Replace the two mutable refs that could change under us at any push:
ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master and sst/opencode/github@latest.
Record all SHAs, versions, and permission justifications in
docs/maintenance/repository-recovery/action-pin-inventory.md.
Verified: all 9 workflows parse as valid YAML; no floating tag/branch refs
remain; every workflow has a top-level permissions block.
* docs(security): add SECURITY.md and private-reporting checklist (Task 06)
- Add root SECURITY.md: supported versions (0.7.x), private reporting via
GitHub's "Report a vulnerability", best-effort response expectations,
coordinated disclosure, and no-secret guidance.
- Add private-vulnerability-reporting checklist that separates repository
file work (this PR) from GitHub settings changes that require their own
approval (Task 07: enabling private vulnerability reporting).
No external links to validate; the reporting path uses the repo Security
tab. SECURITY.md documents the private reporting path ahead of Task 07
enabling it.
* ci(security): add dependency governance and ownership controls (Task 08)
- .github/dependabot.yml: weekly grouped github-actions updates (keeps the
Task 05 SHA pins current). Scoped to actions only — the primary lockfile
is bun.lock and Dependabot's npm ecosystem would desync it; npm
dependency risk is covered by dependency-review below.
- .github/workflows/dependency-review.yml: runs on PRs with contents: read,
SHA-pinned actions, fail-on-severity: high to block newly introduced
high-severity vulnerabilities (exceptions documented inline).
- .github/CODEOWNERS: default owner @darrenhinde with explicit ownership of
security-sensitive paths (workflows, dependabot, CODEOWNERS, SECURITY.md,
scripts/validation).
Verified: dependabot.yml and dependency-review.yml are valid YAML;
dependency-review actions are SHA-pinned with contents: read; CODEOWNERS
owner is the repository owner.
* docs(security): record GitHub security settings evidence (Task 07)
Enable private vulnerability reporting and record read-back evidence.
Settings changed (each approved immediately before, verified by read-back):
- Private vulnerability reporting: enabled=false -> enabled=true. The
Security tab now offers "Report a vulnerability", making the path
documented in SECURITY.md live.
- Dependency Graph / Dependabot alerts: 404 -> 204. This was an
undocumented prerequisite of Task 08's dependency-review.yml, which
failed with "Dependency graph is not enabled"; the Dependency Review
check on PR #336 went fail -> pass after enabling it.
No other repository setting was modified; secret scanning and push
protection are unchanged, and dependabot_security_updates remains disabled
(out of scope, would need its own approval). Both changes are reversible
via the corresponding DELETE calls.
Marks Part B of the private-vulnerability-reporting checklist complete.
Darren Hinde