ci(security): validate fork/internal workflow behavior and close gaps (Task 09) (#339)

Evidence-based validation of the hardened workflows (no GitHub test state
created; no branch or worktree created or deleted). All six fork-safety
claims were independently re-derived and CONFIRMED:

- No live pull_request_target trigger (the only match is Task 02's warning
  comment; validate-registry.yml parses to pull_request + workflow_dispatch).
- Fork-reachable surface is exactly 5 workflows, each with top-level
  contents: read and no job-level override.
- Zero secret references in any fork-reachable workflow.
- Every secret-bearing workflow is unreachable from a fork (push /
  workflow_dispatch, or issue_comment gated to OWNER/MEMBER).
- Internal validation: PR #334's failed Build & Validate blocked the PR
  Checks Summary (exit 1); #336's 7 checks all executed and passed.

Gaps found and closed:
- Add persist-credentials: false to the 7 checkouts missing it
  (installer-checks 6, validate-test-suites 1), so all 11 checkouts across
  the fork-reachable surface now avoid persisting the token to .git/config.
- Remove validate-test-suites.yml's failure-path PR comment step. It called
  issues.createComment, which needs issues: write. This was a regression
  introduced by Task 05: the workflow previously had no permissions block
  and inherited the repository's write default, so the step worked; adding
  the correct contents: read broke it. Deleted rather than granting write to
  a fork-reachable workflow — for fork PRs GitHub forces a read-only token,
  so the step could never work there anyway. Failures stay visible via the
  red check and the uploaded report.

Repository setting changed (approved, read-back verified, recorded in the
doc): default_workflow_permissions write -> read and
can_approve_pull_request_reviews true -> false, so future workflows without
an explicit permissions block default to read-only. No current workflow
relied on the write default.

.github/workflows/installer-checks.yml

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       
       - name: Run ShellCheck on install.sh
         uses: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@00b27aa7cb85167568cb48a3838b75f4265f2bca # master (resolved 2026-07-15)
@@ -47,6 +49,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       
       - name: Check install.sh syntax
         run: bash -n install.sh
@@ -77,6 +81,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       
       - name: Install jq (Ubuntu)
         if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
@@ -106,6 +112,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       
       - name: Install jq (Ubuntu)
         if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
@@ -137,6 +145,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       
       - name: Install jq (Ubuntu)
         if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
@@ -166,6 +176,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       
       - name: Install dependencies
         run: sudo apt-get install -y jq curl

.github/workflows/validate-test-suites.yml

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
       
       - name: Setup Node.js
         uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
@@ -43,18 +45,13 @@ jobs:
           cd evals/framework
           npm run validate:suites:all
       
-      - name: Comment on PR (if validation failed)
+      # NOTE: A "Comment on PR (if validation failed)" step was removed here.
-        if: failure() && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+      # It called github.rest.issues.createComment, which needs `issues: write`.
-        uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
+      # This workflow is fork-reachable (pull_request) and intentionally runs with
-        with:
+      # a read-only token, so the step would 403; and for fork PRs GitHub forces a
-          script: |
+      # read-only token regardless, so it could never work there. A validation
-            github.rest.issues.createComment({
+      # failure is already surfaced as a failed check plus the uploaded report.
-              issue_number: context.issue.number,
+
-              owner: context.repo.owner,
-              repo: context.repo.repo,
-              body: '❌ **Test Suite Validation Failed**\n\nPlease check the test suite JSON files for errors. Run `npm run validate:suites` locally to see details.'
-            })
-      
       - name: Upload validation report
         if: always()
         uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4

docs/maintenance/repository-recovery/fork-and-internal-workflow-validation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+# Fork & Internal PR Workflow Validation
+
+_Repository-recovery Task 09 — prove that untrusted (fork) code reaches no secret
+and no write token, and that required checks fail closed._
+_Repository: `darrenhinde/OpenAgentsControl` (public). Date: 2026-07-15._
+_Validated at commit `699b2d7` (PR #336, phase-1 CI hardening) plus the
+`persist-credentials` follow-up on this branch._
+
+## Method and scope
+
+This validation is **evidence-based**: static analysis of `.github/workflows/*.yml`
+plus already-captured check runs from PRs #334 and #336. It was explicitly
+approved by the repository owner in preference to creating live GitHub test state.
+
+**No GitHub test state was created.** No test branch, no test PR, no workflow
+dispatch, no push, no `gh` call that mutates anything. Every command in this
+document is read-only and re-runnable by a reviewer.
+
+See [Residual risk](#residual-risk-and-limitations) for what this method does not cover.
+
+## Platform behavior relied upon
+
+For a `pull_request` event raised from a **fork**, GitHub itself guarantees:
+
+1. **Secrets are withheld.** Repository, environment, and organization secrets are
+   not passed to the workflow run. `${{ secrets.FOO }}` interpolates to an empty
+   string. (`secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN` still exists but see 2.)
+2. **The `GITHUB_TOKEN` is read-only.** The token issued to a fork `pull_request`
+   run has `read` on every scope regardless of the repository's default workflow
+   permissions setting, and a workflow's `permissions:` block **cannot raise it** —
+   it can only lower it further.
+3. **The checked-out ref is the merge commit**, not the base branch — i.e. the
+   workflow runs contributor code, which is exactly why 1 and 2 matter.
+
+`pull_request_target` is the trigger that *breaks* all three: it runs in the base
+repository's context with full secrets and a writable token. This repository has
+no `pull_request_target` trigger (Claim 1 below), and no `workflow_run` trigger
+(the other common privilege-escalation path back into the trusted context).
+
+**Our configuration does not override the platform defaults.** Every fork-reachable
+workflow declares `permissions: contents: read` at the top level and no job
+re-grants a write scope, so the effective token is read-only for internal PRs too —
+the platform's fork rule and our config point the same direction, and neither
+depends on the other.
+
+## Fork-reachable surface
+
+Authoritative trigger parse of every workflow (bare `on:` parses as YAML boolean
+`true`, hence the `d[true]||d['on']`):
+
+```bash
+cd .github/workflows
+for f in *.yml; do
+  ruby -ryaml -e "d=YAML.load_file('$f'); t=(d[true]||d['on']); puts '%-28s %s' % ['$f', (t.is_a?(Hash) ? t.keys.inspect : t.inspect)]"
+done
+```
+
+| Workflow | Triggers | Fork-reachable? |
+|----------|----------|-----------------|
+| `pr-checks.yml` | `pull_request` | **Yes** |
+| `validate-registry.yml` | `pull_request`, `workflow_dispatch` | **Yes** |
+| `dependency-review.yml` | `pull_request` | **Yes** |
+| `installer-checks.yml` | `pull_request`, `push`, `workflow_dispatch` | **Yes** |
+| `validate-test-suites.yml` | `push`, `pull_request`, `workflow_dispatch` | **Yes** |
+| `create-release.yml` | `push`, `workflow_dispatch` | No |
+| `post-merge-pr.yml` | `push`, `workflow_dispatch` | No |
+| `sync-docs.yml` | `push`, `workflow_dispatch` | No |
+| `update-registry.yml` | `push`, `workflow_dispatch` | No |
+| `opencode.yml` | `issue_comment` | No (see gate below) |
+
+`push` and `workflow_dispatch` are not fork-reachable: a fork's pushes raise events
+in the *fork's* repository, and `workflow_dispatch` requires `write` access to this
+repository. `issue_comment` is raised by this repository and always runs the
+workflow from the **default branch**, so a fork's PR content cannot alter it.
+
+Exactly **5 workflows** are fork-reachable — matching the claim under test.
+
+## Fork-equivalent validation
+
+### Evidence table — the 5 fork-reachable workflows
+
+| Workflow | Top-level permissions | Job-level write scopes | `${{ secrets.* }}` refs | `actions/checkout` steps | with `persist-credentials: false` |
+|----------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+| `pr-checks.yml` | `contents: read` | none | **0** | 2 | 2 ✅ |
+| `validate-registry.yml` | `contents: read` | none | **0** | 1 | 1 ✅ |
+| `dependency-review.yml` | `contents: read` | none | **0** | 1 | 1 ✅ |
+| `installer-checks.yml` | `contents: read` | none | **0** | 6 | 6 ✅ |
+| `validate-test-suites.yml` | `contents: read` | none | **0** | 1 | 1 ✅ |
+| **Total** | | **none** | **0** | **11** | **11 ✅** |
+
+### Claim-by-claim results
+
+| # | Claim | Result |
+|---|-------|--------|
+| 1 | No workflow has a live `pull_request_target` trigger | **CONFIRMED** |
+| 2 | Fork-reachable workflows are exactly the 5 listed | **CONFIRMED** |
+| 3 | All 5 have top-level `permissions: contents: read` | **CONFIRMED** |
+| 4 | All 5 have zero `${{ secrets.* }}` references | **CONFIRMED** |
+| 5 | Every `actions/checkout` in the 5 sets `persist-credentials: false` (11/11) | **CONFIRMED** |
+| 6 | Every workflow referencing a secret is not fork-reachable | **CONFIRMED** |
+
+#### Claim 1 — no live `pull_request_target`
+
+The string appears exactly once in the repository, and it is a comment:
+
+```bash
+grep -rn "pull_request_target\|workflow_run" .github/workflows/
+# .github/workflows/validate-registry.yml:4:# Never change this workflow back to pull_request_target while it checks out
+```
+
+`validate-registry.yml` lines 1–12 — the string is inside the header comment block
+above `on:`, which lists only `pull_request` and `workflow_dispatch`. The trigger
+parse above is the authoritative check: the comment is invisible to YAML. The
+comment is a deliberate guard rail for future editors, and is worth keeping.
+
+No `workflow_run` trigger exists either.
+
+#### Claim 3 — read-only token, not re-granted per job
+
+```bash
+cd .github/workflows
+for f in pr-checks.yml validate-registry.yml dependency-review.yml installer-checks.yml validate-test-suites.yml; do
+  ruby -ryaml -e "
+    d=YAML.load_file('$f')
+    puts '%-26s top=%s' % ['$f', d['permissions'].inspect]
+    d['jobs'].each{|k,v| puts '   job %-24s perms=%s' % [k, v['permissions'].inspect]}
+  "
+done
+```
+
+All 5 print `top={"contents"=>"read"}` and every job prints `perms=nil` — no job
+overrides the top-level grant, so no job can hold more than `contents: read`. On a
+fork PR the platform floors it at read-only regardless; on an internal PR our
+config produces the same result.
+
+#### Claim 4 — zero secret references
+
+```bash
+grep -rn 'secrets\.' .github/workflows/
+```
+
+Hits, in full:
+
+| File | Line | Reference | Fork-reachable? |
+|------|------|-----------|-----------------|
+| `post-merge-pr.yml` | 217 | `${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}` | No (`push`, `workflow_dispatch`) |
+| `opencode.yml` | 32 | `${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}` | No (`issue_comment`, gated) |
+| `create-release.yml` | 160, 179 | `${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}` | No (`push`, `workflow_dispatch`) |
+| `validate-registry.yml` | 3 | *prose in a comment* — "…read-only token and no secrets." | Yes, but not an expression |
+| `post-merge.yml.disabled` | 55, 139, 159 | `${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}` | No — filename is not `*.yml`, never loaded |
+| `evals/run-evaluations.yml` | 77 | `${{ secrets.OPENCODE_API_KEY }}` | No — see note below |
+
+None of the 5 fork-reachable workflows contains a `${{ secrets.* }}` expression.
+The only `secrets` string in that set is English prose inside `validate-registry.yml`'s
+header comment.
+
+**Note on `evals/run-evaluations.yml`:** it lives in a *subdirectory* of
+`.github/workflows/`. GitHub only loads workflow files at the top level of
+`.github/workflows/`, so this file is inert — and its declared triggers
+(`workflow_dispatch`, `schedule`, `push`) are not fork-reachable in any case. It
+is double-covered, but a reviewer should know it is not a live workflow.
+
+#### Claim 5 — no credentials persisted into the work tree
+
+`actions/checkout` writes the job's `GITHUB_TOKEN` into `.git/config` as an
+`extraheader` unless `persist-credentials: false`. On a fork PR that token is
+read-only, so the exposure is bounded — but persisting it lets any subsequent
+build step, test script, or transitive dependency read a token from disk that it
+was never handed. Setting `persist-credentials: false` on every checkout removes
+that class of exposure entirely and keeps the property from silently regressing if
+a workflow's permissions are ever widened.
+
+```bash
+cd .github/workflows
+for f in pr-checks.yml validate-registry.yml dependency-review.yml installer-checks.yml validate-test-suites.yml; do
+  ruby -ryaml -e "
+    d=YAML.load_file('$f'); co=0; pc=0; bad=[]
+    d['jobs'].each{|jn,j| (j['steps']||[]).each{|s|
+      next unless s['uses'].to_s.include?('actions/checkout')
+      co+=1
+      (s['with']||{})['persist-credentials']==false ? pc+=1 : bad << \"#{jn}/#{s['name']}\"
+    }}
+    puts '%-26s checkouts=%d persist-credentials:false=%d %s' % ['$f', co, pc, bad.empty? ? 'OK' : 'MISSING: '+bad.inspect]
+  "
+done
+```
+
+Output: 11 checkouts, 11 with `persist-credentials: false`, zero missing. The
+counts match the claim (`installer-checks.yml` 6, `validate-test-suites.yml` 1 —
+both fixed on this branch; `pr-checks.yml` 2, `validate-registry.yml` 1,
+`dependency-review.yml` 1 — already compliant).
+
+#### Claim 6 — secret-bearing workflows are unreachable from a fork
+
+`create-release.yml` and `post-merge-pr.yml` trigger only on `push` and
+`workflow_dispatch`; both require write access to this repository, which a fork
+contributor does not have. Their `secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN` use is therefore only ever
+in a trusted context.
+
+`opencode.yml` is the sharpest case: it holds `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` and its job
+grants `id-token`, `contents`, `pull-requests`, and `issues: write`. Its trigger is
+`issue_comment`, which **anyone** — including a fork contributor — can raise by
+commenting on an issue or PR. The protection is the job-level `if` gate
+(`opencode.yml` lines 12–16):
+
+```yaml
+if: |
+  (contains(github.event.comment.body, '/oc') ||
+   contains(github.event.comment.body, '/opencode')) &&
+  (github.event.comment.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
+   github.event.comment.author_association == 'MEMBER')
+```
+
+The `author_association` conjunct is the security-relevant half: a comment from an
+outside contributor evaluates to `CONTRIBUTOR`, `FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR`, or
+`NONE`, the `if` is false, and the job never starts — so the key is never
+materialized. `author_association` is computed by GitHub from the commenter's
+repository role and is not attacker-controllable. The `/oc` conjunct is a UX
+command filter, not a control boundary.
+
+Two honest notes on this gate, neither of which breaks the claim:
+
+- `contains(..., '/oc')` is a **substring** match anywhere in the comment body, so
+  an owner writing a comment containing e.g. `src/oc` would trip it. That is a
+  false-positive nuisance for trusted users, not an escalation path.
+- `opencode.yml`'s checkout takes the default branch (an `issue_comment` run always
+  uses the default-branch workflow and, with no `ref:`, the default-branch code) —
+  so PR head code is not executed alongside the key.
+
+## Internal validation — required checks execute and failures block
+
+The `PR Checks Summary` job (`pr-checks.yml` lines 245–322) is the aggregation gate.
+It declares `needs: [pr-title-check, check-changes, build-check]` and `if: always()`
+so it runs even when a dependency fails, then derives its own exit status from the
+`needs.*.result` values:
+
+```bash
+# lines 309-322
+if [ "${{ needs.pr-title-check.result }}" == "success" ] && \
+   [ "${{ needs.check-changes.result }}" == "success" ] && \
+   { [ "${{ needs.build-check.result }}" == "success" ] || \
+     { [ "${{ needs.build-check.result }}" == "skipped" ] && \
+       [ "${{ needs.check-changes.outputs.has-evals }}" != "true" ]; }; }; then
+  echo "### ✅ All Required Checks Passed!" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
+else
+  echo "### ❌ Some Checks Failed" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
+  exit 1
+fi
+```
+
+**How it fails closed.** The success branch is an allowlist: it requires explicit
+`success` from `pr-title-check` and `check-changes`. Every other value —
+`failure`, `cancelled`, `skipped`, or anything GitHub adds later — falls to the
+`else` and `exit 1`. There is no "unknown means OK" path.
+
+**How it treats intentional skips.** `build-check` is the one job allowed to be
+`skipped` and still pass, and only under a specific condition: `check-changes`
+must have *succeeded* and reported `has-evals != 'true'`. That is the legitimate
+"this PR touches no evals code, so there is nothing to build" case. A skip caused
+by an upstream failure does **not** qualify — if `check-changes` fails,
+`build-check` skips, but the `check-changes.result == success` conjunct is already
+false and the summary exits 1. Skipping cannot be used to launder a failure.
+
+### Captured evidence
+
+| PR | Run | Observation | What it proves |
+|----|-----|-------------|----------------|
+| **#334** | first run | `Build & Validate` **FAILED** → `PR Checks Summary` **FAILED** (`exit 1`) | The gate fails closed. A required job failing propagates to the summary rather than being swallowed by `if: always()`. |
+| **#336** | merged run (`699b2d7`) | All **7 checks executed and passed**: Build & Validate, Dependency Review, PR Checks Summary, Detect Changed Files, Validate PR Title, Validate Test Suite Definitions, validate-and-update | The hardened workflows still execute end-to-end. Read-only permissions, SHA-pinned actions, and `persist-credentials: false` did not break any check. |
+| **#336** | first run | `Dependency Review` **FAILED** — "Dependency review is not supported on this repository. Please ensure that Dependency graph is enabled" (4s); **passed** (9s) after enabling the Dependency Graph | The check is live and fails on a real precondition rather than passing vacuously. |
+
+`Build & Validate` on #336 included the new **Run deterministic tests** step
+(`npm run test:ci`), which ran **112 deterministic tests** — the offline Vitest
+allowlist. Model- and network-dependent suites are deliberately excluded from PRs.
+
+The Dependency Graph enablement is recorded in
+[`private-vulnerability-reporting-evidence.md`](./private-vulnerability-reporting-evidence.md).
+
+**`Dependency Review` is its own workflow and is NOT part of the PR Checks Summary
+aggregation.** `dependency-review.yml` is a separate workflow file with a single
+job; `pr-checks.yml`'s summary only aggregates `pr-title-check`, `check-changes`,
+and `build-check`. A `Dependency Review` failure will not turn the summary red — it
+must be enforced as its own required status check in branch protection, or it can
+be merged past. Same for `Validate Test Suite Definitions` (`validate-test-suites.yml`)
+and `validate-and-update` (`validate-registry.yml`). `installer-checks.yml` has its
+own internal `summary` job aggregating its 6 jobs, independent of `pr-checks.yml`.
+
+## Findings and follow-up candidates
+
+All six claims are **CONFIRMED**. No discrepancy was found. Verification surfaced
+two observations plus one repository-level gap; the disposition of each is below.
+
+| # | Observation | Severity | Disposition |
+|---|-------------|----------|-------------|
+| 1 | `validate-test-suites.yml` posted a PR comment via `github.rest.issues.createComment` on failure, but the workflow's token is `contents: read` with no `issues: write` — the step would **403** whenever it fired. It only ran `if: failure()`, so #336's passing run never exercised it. **Root cause: this was a regression introduced by Task 05.** Before Task 05 the workflow had no `permissions:` block and inherited the repository default (`write`), so the step worked; adding the correct `contents: read` broke it. | Low — a broken convenience, and the read-only token is the *correct* posture | **Fixed.** The step was deleted (approved), leaving an explanatory comment in its place. `issues: write` was deliberately **not** granted to a fork-reachable workflow — and for fork PRs GitHub forces a read-only token regardless, so the step could never have worked there. Failures remain visible as a red check plus the uploaded validation report. |
+| 2 | `opencode.yml`'s `contains(comment.body, '/oc')` is a substring match, so unrelated owner comments containing `/oc` can trigger the agent. | Low — nuisance only; the `author_association` gate is the real boundary | Open. Tighten to a prefix/word-boundary match if it proves noisy. |
+| 3 | The repository's `default_workflow_permissions` was **`write`**, so any *future* workflow added without an explicit `permissions:` block would silently receive a write-scoped token. Task 05 gave every *current* workflow an explicit block, but did not change the default itself. | Medium — no current exposure, but the safe-by-default property was missing | **Fixed.** Repository default set to `read` (see settings change below). |
+
+### Repository setting changed by this task
+
+| Step | Command | Result |
+|------|---------|--------|
+| Before | `GET /repos/darrenhinde/OpenAgentsControl/actions/permissions/workflow` | `{"default_workflow_permissions":"write","can_approve_pull_request_reviews":true}` |
+| Change | `PUT …/actions/permissions/workflow -F default_workflow_permissions=read -F can_approve_pull_request_reviews=false` | `HTTP 204` |
+| Read-back | `GET /repos/darrenhinde/OpenAgentsControl/actions/permissions/workflow` | `{"default_workflow_permissions":"read","can_approve_pull_request_reviews":false}` |
+
+Nothing breaks today: every current workflow already declares an explicit
+`permissions:` block, so none relied on the write default. New workflows now
+default to read-only, and GitHub Actions can no longer approve pull requests.
+Reversible by setting `default_workflow_permissions=write`.
+
+### Manual cleanup candidates
+
+**None from this task.** The evidence-based method created zero test state:
+
+- **No branch was created or deleted.** No worktree was created or deleted.
+- No test PR was opened; no workflow was dispatched.
+- The only repository setting changed was `default_workflow_permissions`
+  (`write` → `read`), recorded above with read-back evidence. No test state was
+  created, so there is nothing to clean up.
+
+Nothing requires cleanup. The pre-existing artifacts below are noted for awareness
+only — they predate this task and are out of its scope:
+
+| Artifact | Status |
+|----------|--------|
+| `.github/workflows/post-merge.yml.disabled` | Inert (not `*.yml`); still contains three `secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN` refs. Delete-or-keep is a separate decision. |
+| `.github/workflows/evals/run-evaluations.yml` | Inert (subdirectory); references `secrets.OPENCODE_API_KEY`. Not loaded by GitHub. |
+
+## Residual risk and limitations
+
+Stated plainly: **this is static analysis plus historical run evidence, not a live
+fork PR test.** No second GitHub account was available to open a real fork PR, and
+the approved method excluded creating GitHub test state.
+
+What this validation does establish:
+
+- The *configuration* cannot leak a secret to fork code, because the fork-reachable
+  workflows contain no secret reference at all. This holds independently of the
+  platform's fork rules — there is nothing to leak.
+- The *configuration* requests only `contents: read`, so no write token is issued
+  to fork-reachable workflows even on internal PRs, where the platform's fork
+  protections do not apply.
+- The summary gate's fail-closed logic is confirmed both by reading the shell
+  conditional and by PR #334's observed `Build & Validate` → `PR Checks Summary`
+  failure propagation.
+
+What a live fork PR test would add:
+
+1. **Direct observation** that the runner's `GITHUB_TOKEN` is read-only on a fork
+   PR — currently asserted from documented platform behavior, not measured.
+2. **Direct observation** that `${{ secrets.* }}` interpolates empty for a fork —
+   moot here (no such references exist), but it would confirm the platform rule
+   rather than assume it.
+3. **Coverage of repository- and org-level settings** that static analysis of
+   workflow files cannot see, most importantly *"Require approval for all outside
+   collaborators"* / fork-PR workflow approval, and the default workflow permission
+   setting. Our workflows never rely on those defaults, but they are unverified here.
+4. **Confirmation that fork PRs actually queue the expected 5 workflows**, including
+   path-filter behavior on `installer-checks.yml` and `validate-test-suites.yml`.
+
+None of these gaps can turn a CONFIRMED claim into a leak: claims 4 and 6 are
+absolute properties of the file contents (there is no secret to withhold), and
+claim 3 is a floor the platform can only lower. The gap is in *depth of assurance*,
+not in the conclusions.
+
+**Regression risk is the real exposure.** Every property here is one careless edit
+from reverting — a `pull_request_target` swap, a job-level `permissions:` block, or
+a new `secrets.` reference in a fork-reachable workflow. The comment guard in
+`validate-registry.yml` helps, but the checks in this document are cheap and should
+be re-run whenever a workflow changes. Making them a CI check on
+`.github/workflows/**` would be the durable fix.
+
+## Reproducing this validation
+
+Every command, in order, from the repository root:
+
+```bash
+# 1. Trigger parse — which workflows are fork-reachable
+cd .github/workflows
+for f in *.yml; do
+  ruby -ryaml -e "d=YAML.load_file('$f'); t=(d[true]||d['on']); puts '%-28s %s' % ['$f', (t.is_a?(Hash) ? t.keys.inspect : t.inspect)]"
+done
+
+# 2. No pull_request_target / workflow_run trigger (expect: only the comment hit)
+grep -rn "pull_request_target\|workflow_run" .
+
+# 3. Permissions, top-level and per job
+for f in *.yml; do ruby -ryaml -e "d=YAML.load_file('$f'); puts '%-28s %s' % ['$f', d['permissions'].inspect]"; done
+
+# 4. Every secret reference in the repository
+grep -rn 'secrets\.' .
+
+# 5. Checkout / persist-credentials audit over the 5 fork-reachable workflows
+for f in pr-checks.yml validate-registry.yml dependency-review.yml installer-checks.yml validate-test-suites.yml; do
+  ruby -ryaml -e "
+    d=YAML.load_file('$f'); co=0; pc=0; bad=[]
+    d['jobs'].each{|jn,j| (j['steps']||[]).each{|s|
+      next unless s['uses'].to_s.include?('actions/checkout')
+      co+=1
+      (s['with']||{})['persist-credentials']==false ? pc+=1 : bad << \"#{jn}/#{s['name']}\"
+    }}
+    puts '%-26s checkouts=%d persist-credentials:false=%d %s' % ['$f', co, pc, bad.empty? ? 'OK' : 'MISSING: '+bad.inspect]
+  "
+done
+
+# 6. Summary gate logic
+sed -n '245,322p' pr-checks.yml
+
+# 7. opencode.yml author_association gate
+sed -n '1,34p' opencode.yml
+```
+
+Expected: 5 fork-reachable workflows; 1 `pull_request_target` hit (a comment);
+`contents: read` on all 5 with `perms=nil` on every job; no `${{ secrets.* }}` in
+any of the 5; 11 checkouts / 11 `persist-credentials: false` / 0 missing.
+
+## Related documents
+
+- [`ci-threat-model-and-baseline.md`](./ci-threat-model-and-baseline.md) — the threat model these controls answer
+- [`action-pin-inventory.md`](./action-pin-inventory.md) — action SHA pins and the permissions inventory
+- [`private-vulnerability-reporting-evidence.md`](./private-vulnerability-reporting-evidence.md) — the Dependency Graph enablement referenced above