NextMyDay/internal/core/server/server_test.go
Claus Lohmar 4d5d1f674e fix(security): gate /setup per request and pin the setup module
REVIEW-001 (M0) HIGH H2: loopback was enforced only at BIND, so a reverse
proxy on 127.0.0.1 relaying remote clients reached /setup and could create
the top admin — exactly the first-visitor-wins D-025 claims to close "in
code". In setup mode, reject any request whose RESOLVED client IP is not
loopback (404 before dispatch); an unparseable/empty client IP fails closed.
The resolved IP is the one XFF produces, so a trusted proxy forwarding a
remote client does not launder it (see the new test).

Also:
- M1c/L3s: pin the setup module at the door. serveSetupAction rejects
  Module != "setup", and any other resolution naming it (a GUID path, a
  reserved workflow) 404s instead of falling through to serveGUID.
- L1s: read/clear the session cookie under its transport-correct name.

Tests: the harness speaks from a loopback peer by default (the operator
reaches /setup over a tunnel) and configures a public base_url where the
nudge must fire (L7c). New tests cover the per-request setup gate (including
the trusted-proxy relay and the loopback tunnel) and the module pin, both of
which fail without the fix.
2026-10-14 11:30:13 +00:00

745 lines
26 KiB
Go

package server_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/audit"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/auth"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/auth/flow"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/auth/totp"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/config"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/httpx"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/middleware"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/routing"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/server"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/store"
"git.lohmar.co.uk/cclohmar/NextMyDay/internal/core/users"
)
// ── fakes / wrappers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// The counting wrappers embed the real interface and increment a counter before
// delegating, so a test can prove "the door never touched this" (AC-2).
type countingResolver struct {
routing.Resolver
calls *int
}
func (c countingResolver) GUID(g string) (bool, bool) { *c.calls++; return c.Resolver.GUID(g) }
type countingSessions struct {
auth.Sessions
calls *int
}
func (c countingSessions) Validate(ctx context.Context, id string) (auth.Session, error) {
*c.calls++
return c.Sessions.Validate(ctx, id)
}
type countingIdentities struct {
auth.Identities
calls *int
}
func (c countingIdentities) ByGUID(ctx context.Context, g string) (auth.Identity, error) {
*c.calls++
return c.Identities.ByGUID(ctx, g)
}
type countingUsers struct {
users.Users
calls *int
}
func (c countingUsers) Get(ctx context.Context, id int64) (users.User, error) {
*c.calls++
return c.Users.Get(ctx, id)
}
// probeCapture records what the door handed to a module function.
type probeCapture struct {
rc *server.RequestContext
meta audit.Meta
metaOK bool
}
// ── registry ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func testRegistry(cap *probeCapture) *server.MapRegistry {
reg := server.NewMapRegistry()
reg.RegisterCore("home", server.Home)
reg.RegisterCore("login", server.LoginPlaceholder)
reg.RegisterCore("enroll", server.EnrollPlaceholder)
reg.RegisterCore("setup", server.SetupPlaceholder)
reg.RegisterCore("access", server.AccessPlaceholder)
reg.RegisterModule(server.NewModule("home").
SetDefault("dashboard", server.Home).
AddRoute("home", "home", server.Home))
reg.RegisterModule(server.NewModule("hr").
AddAction("save-data", "save-data", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, _ *server.RequestContext) error {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, err := w.Write([]byte("saved"))
return err
}))
reg.RegisterModule(server.NewModule("probe").
AddRoute("show", "show", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, rc *server.RequestContext) error {
if cap != nil {
cap.rc = rc
cap.meta, cap.metaOK = audit.MetaFrom(r.Context())
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, err := w.Write([]byte("probe"))
return err
}))
return reg
}
// ── harness ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type harness struct {
t *testing.T
ctx context.Context
db *store.DB
users *users.Store
ids *auth.IdentitiesService
sessions *auth.SessionsService
csrf *httpx.CSRF
pre *httpx.PreSessionCSRF
wa *fakeWebAuthn
totp *totp.Generator
srv *server.Server
adminID int64
guid string
session auth.Session
}
func newHarness(t *testing.T, opts ...func(*server.Deps)) *harness {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
db, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("store.Open: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
if err := db.Migrate(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Migrate: %v", err)
}
aud := audit.New(db.DB)
us := users.New(db.DB, aud)
adminID, err := us.Create(ctx, 0, "admin@example.com", "Admin", users.RoleAdmin)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bootstrap admin: %v", err)
}
sealer, err := auth.NewAEADSealer(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x42}, auth.KeySize))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAEADSealer: %v", err)
}
core := auth.New(db.DB, aud, auth.WithSealer(sealer))
ids := core.Identities()
sessions := core.Sessions()
idID, guid, err := ids.Mint(ctx, adminID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Mint: %v", err)
}
if err := ids.Activate(ctx, idID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Activate: %v", err)
}
sess, err := sessions.Mint(ctx, idID, "127.0.0.1", "test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session Mint: %v", err)
}
const (
csrfKey = "test-csrf-key-0123456789abcdef"
cookieSecret = "test-cookie-secret-0123456789abcdef"
)
csrf, err := httpx.NewCSRF([]byte(csrfKey))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewCSRF: %v", err)
}
pre, err := httpx.NewPreSessionCSRF([]byte(cookieSecret), false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewPreSessionCSRF: %v", err)
}
cfg := &config.Config{
Setup: false,
Server: config.Server{Listen: "127.0.0.1:8080", BaseURL: "http://example.com"},
// BaseURL is a PUBLIC origin on purpose: the passkey nudge only fires
// off-loopback (SPEC-006 §8), and L7c makes the CONFIGURED origin the
// signal — so a test that wants loopback must configure it.
Database: config.Database{Path: db.Path()},
Secrets: config.Secrets{CSRFKey: csrfKey, CookieSecret: cookieSecret},
}
wa := &fakeWebAuthn{}
totpSvc := totp.New("MyDay", ids)
deps := server.Deps{
Config: cfg,
Resolver: ids,
Sessions: sessions,
Identities: ids,
Users: us,
Audit: aud,
CSRF: csrf,
PreSession: pre,
}
for _, o := range opts {
o(&deps)
}
// Build the SPEC-006 flow with the (possibly overridden) logger + CSRF, and
// register it unless the test supplied its own registry.
authFlow, err := flow.New(flow.Deps{
Identities: ids,
Credentials: ids,
Sessions: sessions,
Users: us,
WebAuthn: wa,
TOTP: totpSvc,
CSRF: deps.PreSession,
Audit: aud,
Logger: deps.Logger,
// L7c: the nudge's origin signal is the CONFIGURED base_url, not the
// (proxy-rewritable) request Host.
BaseURL: deps.Config.Server.BaseURL,
// The passkey nudge (SPEC-006 §8) is suppressed in setup mode; the
// door's SetupMode is the same predicate (nil = nudge enabled).
SuppressNudge: deps.SetupMode,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("flow.New: %v", err)
}
if deps.Registry == nil {
reg := testRegistry(nil)
server.RegisterAuthFlow(reg, authFlow)
deps.Registry = reg
}
srv, err := server.New(deps)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("server.New: %v", err)
}
return &harness{
t: t, ctx: ctx, db: db, users: us, ids: ids, sessions: sessions,
csrf: csrf, pre: pre, wa: wa, totp: totpSvc, srv: srv,
adminID: adminID, guid: guid, session: sess,
}
}
// preCSRF mints a signed pre-session token plus its cookie, as the enroll/login
// screens would (A15).
func (h *harness) preCSRF() (*http.Cookie, string) {
h.t.Helper()
tok, err := h.pre.Token()
if err != nil {
h.t.Fatalf("pre-session Token: %v", err)
}
return &http.Cookie{Name: httpx.PreSessionCookieName, Value: tok}, tok
}
func (h *harness) cookie() *http.Cookie {
return &http.Cookie{Name: httpx.SessionCookieName, Value: h.session.ID}
}
// loopbackPeer is the RemoteAddr the test door speaks from. Setup mode is
// loopback-only PER REQUEST (SPEC-003 §7, H2), so tests must explicitly opt in
// to a non-loopback peer to exercise the rejection.
const loopbackPeer = "127.0.0.1:52345"
// request issues a request directly against the door (no network).
func request(h http.Handler, method, target string, cookies ...*http.Cookie) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, target, nil)
req.RemoteAddr = loopbackPeer // the operator reaches /setup over a tunnel
for _, c := range cookies {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
// ── AC-1 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC1_RedirectAndNotFound(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t)
rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/")
if rec.Code != http.StatusFound {
t.Fatalf("GET / = %d, want 302", rec.Code)
}
if loc := rec.Header().Get("Location"); loc != "/home" {
t.Errorf("Location = %q, want /home", loc)
}
rec = request(h.srv, "GET", "/holy-shit")
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("GET /holy-shit = %d, want 404", rec.Code)
}
}
// ── AC-2 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC2_HomeNoSessionNoDB(t *testing.T) {
var resolverCalls, validateCalls, byGUIDCalls, getCalls int
h := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) {
d.Resolver = countingResolver{Resolver: d.Resolver, calls: &resolverCalls}
d.Sessions = countingSessions{Sessions: d.Sessions, calls: &validateCalls}
d.Identities = countingIdentities{Identities: d.Identities, calls: &byGUIDCalls}
d.Users = countingUsers{Users: d.Users, calls: &getCalls}
})
rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/home")
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("GET /home = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "MyDay") {
t.Error("GET /home did not render the landing page")
}
if resolverCalls != 0 || validateCalls != 0 || byGUIDCalls != 0 || getCalls != 0 {
t.Errorf("/home touched storage: resolver=%d sessions=%d identities=%d users=%d (AC-2)",
resolverCalls, validateCalls, byGUIDCalls, getCalls)
}
}
// ── AC-3 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC3_GUIDWithAndWithoutSession(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t)
// No session -> the login screen (a rendered page: 200, F-1).
rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/"+h.guid)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("GET /{guid} without a session = %d, want 200 (login screen, F-1)", rec.Code)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "Sign in") {
t.Error("GET /{guid} without a session did not render the login screen (AC-3)")
}
// Valid session -> the module function (the dashboard).
rec = request(h.srv, "GET", "/"+h.guid, h.cookie())
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("GET /{guid} with a session = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "MyDay") {
t.Error("the module function did not render the dashboard")
}
// /{GUID}/home is the same user landing.
rec = request(h.srv, "GET", "/"+h.guid+"/home", h.cookie())
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("GET /{guid}/home with a session = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
}
// ── AC-4 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC4_SessionUserMismatchRejected(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t)
// A second user with an active identity.
otherID, err := h.users.Create(h.ctx, h.adminID, "b@example.com", "B", users.RoleTeam)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create other user: %v", err)
}
idOther, guidOther, err := h.ids.Mint(h.ctx, otherID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Mint other: %v", err)
}
if err := h.ids.Activate(h.ctx, idOther); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Activate other: %v", err)
}
// The admin's session must NOT open the other user's GUID: the door hands
// off to the login screen (200, a rendered page — F-1), never the module.
rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/"+guidOther, h.cookie())
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("GET /{other-guid} with a foreign session = %d, want 200 (login screen, AC-4)", rec.Code)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "Sign in") {
t.Error("a foreign session did not land on the login screen (AC-4)")
}
// The dashboard marker proves the module function was never reached (the
// shell's own chrome carries "MyDay" on every page, login included).
if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "Your day, at a glance.") {
t.Error("a foreign session reached the module function (AC-4)")
}
}
// ── AC-5 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC5_EmptyOrMissingSessionRejected(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t)
empty := &http.Cookie{Name: httpx.SessionCookieName, Value: ""}
cases := []struct {
name string
target string
cookie *http.Cookie
}{
{"missing id on /{guid}", "/" + h.guid, nil},
{"empty id on /{guid}", "/" + h.guid, empty},
{"missing id on /{guid}/home", "/" + h.guid + "/home", nil},
{"empty id on /{guid}/home", "/" + h.guid + "/home", empty},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder
if tc.cookie == nil {
rec = request(h.srv, "GET", tc.target)
} else {
rec = request(h.srv, "GET", tc.target, tc.cookie)
}
// The door rejects the empty/missing session and renders the login
// screen (200, F-1) — it must never reach the module.
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%s = %d, want 200 (login screen, A2/F-1)", tc.target, rec.Code)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "Sign in") {
t.Errorf("%s did not render the login screen (A2)", tc.target)
}
})
}
}
// ── AC-6 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC6_ActionRequiresCSRF(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t)
base := "/" + h.guid + "?do=hr&action=save-data"
// No CSRF token -> rejected.
rec := request(h.srv, "POST", base, h.cookie())
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("action without a CSRF token = %d, want 403 (AC-6)", rec.Code)
}
// A wrong token -> rejected.
rec = request(h.srv, "POST", base+"&csrf=wrong", h.cookie())
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("action with a bad CSRF token = %d, want 403", rec.Code)
}
// The correct, session-bound token -> dispatched.
token := url.QueryEscape(h.csrf.Token(h.session.ID))
rec = request(h.srv, "POST", base+"&csrf="+token, h.cookie())
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("action with a valid CSRF token = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "saved") {
t.Error("the action handler did not run")
}
}
// ── AC-7 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC7_LoopbackEnforcement(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
setup bool
listen string
want bool // want an error?
}{
{true, "0.0.0.0:8080", true},
{true, ":8080", true},
{true, "192.168.1.5:8080", true},
{true, "127.0.0.1:8080", false},
{true, "localhost:8080", false},
{true, "[::1]:8080", false},
{false, "0.0.0.0:8080", false}, // productive: a public bind is allowed
}
for _, tc := range cases {
err := server.CheckSetupBind(tc.setup, tc.listen)
if tc.want && !errors.Is(err, server.ErrNonLoopbackSetup) {
t.Errorf("CheckSetupBind(%v, %q) = %v, want ErrNonLoopbackSetup", tc.setup, tc.listen, err)
}
if !tc.want && err != nil {
t.Errorf("CheckSetupBind(%v, %q) = %v, want nil", tc.setup, tc.listen, err)
}
}
// The full Serve path refuses to bind too (no listener is opened).
h := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) { d.SetupMode = func() bool { return true } })
if err := h.srv.Serve("0.0.0.0:0"); !errors.Is(err, server.ErrNonLoopbackSetup) {
t.Errorf("Serve with a public listen in setup mode = %v, want ErrNonLoopbackSetup (AC-7)", err)
}
}
// ── AC-8 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC8_CorrelationAndRedaction(t *testing.T) {
var logs bytes.Buffer
h := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) {
d.Logger = slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&logs, nil))
})
rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/home")
cid := rec.Header().Get(middleware.CorrelationHeader)
if cid == "" {
t.Fatal("the response carries no correlation id (AC-8)")
}
if !strings.Contains(logs.String(), cid) {
t.Errorf("the log does not echo the correlation id %q (AC-8)", cid)
}
// A credential riding the path is redacted in the log.
logs.Reset()
request(h.srv, "GET", "/setup/token/SUPERSECRETTOKEN")
out := logs.String()
if strings.Contains(out, "SUPERSECRETTOKEN") {
t.Error("the access log leaked a path credential (A8/AC-8)")
}
if !strings.Contains(out, httpx.Redacted) {
t.Errorf("the access log did not mark the redaction (%q)", out)
}
}
// ── AC-9 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestAC9_RateLimiterOnAuthRoutes(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) {
d.RateLimit = 2
d.RateWindow = time.Minute
})
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
if rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/access"); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("request %d = %d, want 200", i+1, rec.Code)
}
}
rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/access")
if rec.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("third request = %d, want 429 (AC-9)", rec.Code)
}
if rec.Header().Get("Retry-After") == "" {
t.Error("429 is missing a Retry-After header")
}
}
// ── supporting behaviour ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// TestRequestContextHandover proves §5: the module function receives the
// resolved identification, and the door attached audit.Meta (R-1).
func TestRequestContextHandover(t *testing.T) {
var cap probeCapture
h := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) { d.Registry = testRegistry(&cap) })
rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/"+h.guid+"/probe/show", h.cookie())
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("probe/show = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
if cap.rc == nil {
t.Fatal("the module function was never invoked")
}
if cap.rc.UserID != h.adminID {
t.Errorf("rc.UserID = %d, want %d", cap.rc.UserID, h.adminID)
}
if want := "user:" + strconv.FormatInt(h.adminID, 10); cap.rc.Principal != want {
t.Errorf("rc.Principal = %q, want %q", cap.rc.Principal, want)
}
if cap.rc.Workflow != h.guid {
t.Errorf("rc.Workflow = %q, want the GUID %q", cap.rc.Workflow, h.guid)
}
if cap.rc.Function != "show" {
t.Errorf("rc.Function = %q, want show", cap.rc.Function)
}
if cap.rc.Correlation == "" || cap.rc.ClientIP == "" {
t.Errorf("rc correlation/client IP not set: %+v", cap.rc)
}
if !cap.metaOK {
t.Fatal("audit.Meta was not attached to the context (R-1)")
}
if cap.meta.ActorUserID != h.adminID {
t.Errorf("meta.ActorUserID = %d, want %d", cap.meta.ActorUserID, h.adminID)
}
if cap.meta.CorrelationID != cap.rc.Correlation {
t.Errorf("meta.CorrelationID = %q, want %q", cap.meta.CorrelationID, cap.rc.Correlation)
}
}
// TestSetupModeRouting: /setup is served only in setup mode (SPEC-003 §4).
func TestSetupModeRouting(t *testing.T) {
productive := newHarness(t)
if rec := request(productive.srv, "GET", "/setup"); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("GET /setup in productive mode = %d, want 404", rec.Code)
}
// The action door must also 404 /setup in productive mode.
if rec := request(productive.srv, "POST", "/setup?do=setup&action=begin"); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("POST /setup?do=setup in productive mode = %d, want 404", rec.Code)
}
inSetup := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) { d.SetupMode = func() bool { return true } })
if rec := request(inSetup.srv, "GET", "/setup"); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("GET /setup in setup mode = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
}
// TestSpec003SetupIsLoopbackOnlyPerRequest is H2: the bind-time check is not
// enough — a reverse proxy on 127.0.0.1 relaying a remote client must not make
// /setup reachable (first-visitor-wins).
func TestSpec003SetupIsLoopbackOnlyPerRequest(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) { d.SetupMode = func() bool { return true } })
// A remote client → 404 before dispatch, on every setup route.
for _, tc := range []struct{ method, target string }{
{"GET", "/setup"},
{"POST", "/setup?do=setup&action=domain.save"},
{"GET", "/static/app.css"},
} {
req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.target, nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:4444" // a remote peer through the proxy
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("%s %s from a non-loopback client = %d, want 404 (H2)", tc.method, tc.target, rec.Code)
}
}
// The tunnel (a loopback peer) still works.
if rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/setup"); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("GET /setup from loopback = %d, want 200 (H2 must not break the tunnel)", rec.Code)
}
// A trusted proxy forwarding X-Forwarded-For does NOT launder a remote
// client into loopback: the resolved client IP is what is checked.
h2 := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) {
d.SetupMode = func() bool { return true }
d.Config.Server.TrustedProxies = []string{"127.0.0.1"}
})
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/setup", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999" // the proxy itself is local...
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.9")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h2.srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("GET /setup relayed by a trusted proxy = %d, want 404 (H2: the RESOLVED client is remote)", rec.Code)
}
}
// TestSpec003SetupModulePinnedAtTheDoor covers M1c/L3s: the wizard's module is
// reachable ONLY through the reserved `setup` workflow. The registry mounts a
// `setup` module and a `core` action module, so a missing pin would actually
// dispatch them (that is what makes the assertion meaningful).
func TestSpec003SetupModulePinnedAtTheDoor(t *testing.T) {
ok := func(msg string) server.Handler {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, _ *server.RequestContext) error {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, err := w.Write([]byte(msg))
return err
}
}
registry := func() *server.MapRegistry {
reg := server.NewMapRegistry()
reg.RegisterCore("home", server.Home)
reg.RegisterModule(server.NewModule("home").
SetDefault("dashboard", server.Home).
AddRoute("home", "home", server.Home))
reg.RegisterModule(server.NewModule("setup").
AddAction("admin.create", "admin.create", ok("created")))
reg.RegisterModule(server.NewModule("core").
AddAction("modules.toggle", "modules.toggle", ok("toggled")))
return reg
}
// In setup mode: `do=core` under /setup must not reach the core action,
// even with a valid pre-session CSRF token (M1c).
inSetup := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) {
d.Registry = registry()
d.SetupMode = func() bool { return true }
})
cookie, token := inSetup.preCSRF()
form := url.Values{"csrf": {token}}.Encode()
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/setup?do=core&action=modules.toggle", strings.NewReader(form))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.RemoteAddr = loopbackPeer
req.AddCookie(cookie)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
inSetup.srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("do=core under /setup in setup mode = %d, want 404 (M1c)", rec.Code)
}
// In productive mode: a GUID action naming the setup module must 404 rather
// than fall through to serveGUID and dispatch it (L3s).
productive := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) { d.Registry = registry() })
target := "/" + productive.guid + "?do=setup&action=admin.create"
token2 := url.QueryEscape(productive.csrf.Token(productive.session.ID))
rec2 := request(productive.srv, "POST", target+"&csrf="+token2, productive.cookie())
if rec2.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("POST %s = %d, want 404 (L3s: the setup module is pinned to the setup workflow)", target, rec2.Code)
}
// And under a reserved level-1 workflow (not just a GUID).
rec3 := request(productive.srv, "POST", "/home?do=setup&action=admin.create&csrf="+token2)
if rec3.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("do=setup under /home = %d, want 404 (L3s)", rec3.Code)
}
}
// TestEnrollRouting: a pending identity routes to the enrollment screen.
func TestEnrollRouting(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t)
pendingUser, err := h.users.Create(h.ctx, h.adminID, "pending@example.com", "P", users.RoleTeam)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create pending user: %v", err)
}
_, guidPending, err := h.ids.Mint(h.ctx, pendingUser) // pending_enrollment
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Mint pending: %v", err)
}
rec := request(h.srv, "GET", "/"+guidPending)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("GET /{pending-guid} = %d, want 200 (enroll)", rec.Code)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "Enrollment") {
t.Error("a pending GUID did not route to the enrollment screen")
}
}
// TestTrustedProxyClientIPAtTheDoor: only a trusted peer's XFF is honoured.
func TestTrustedProxyClientIPAtTheDoor(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t, func(d *server.Deps) {
d.Config.Server.TrustedProxies = []string{"127.0.0.1"}
})
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/home", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:9999"
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.77")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
if got := req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); got != "203.0.113.77" {
t.Errorf("X-Forwarded-For = %q, want the client value SET (never appended)", got)
}
}