REVIEW-001 (M0) perimeter findings:
- H1: resolveForwarded walked X-Forwarded-For left→right and returned the
leftmost untrusted entry. An append-style proxy (nginx's default) appends
the peer it saw to the RIGHT of whatever the client sent, so the leftmost
entry is attacker-controlled — a fresh rate-limit bucket per request (A3)
and a forged client_ip in the audit trail (A11/D-031). Walk right→left and
return the first untrusted entry, falling back to the peer.
- L1s: the session cookie now carries the `__Host-` prefix when it is Secure
(https), so it is pinned to the exact origin and cannot be shadowed from a
sibling subdomain. Conditional on purpose: a browser rejects a `__Host-`
cookie without Secure, which would break the http loopback bootstrap.
- L4s: add Permissions-Policy, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy and
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy.
- Add httpx.IsLoopbackIP: a RESOLVED client IP test that fails closed on an
empty/unparseable value (the setup-mode gate, H2), sharing a classifier
with IsLoopbackHost whose "unknown" direction is the opposite, each
fail-closed for its own decision.
Tests updated: the unit test encoding the vulnerable leftmost expectation is
rewritten, plus right→left/forged-entry/host-classification coverage.
- store: SQLite (WAL, foreign keys ON, CGO-free driver) + the embedded
migration runner; each module's migrations are name-prefixed (D-012)
- audit: the append-only audit log; the actor threads via context (R-1)
- users: the user_id/GUID/email anchors (D-013)
- config: the YAML settings file (D-035) + validation
- httpx: cookies · loopback detection · trusted-proxy XFF · CSRF · security
headers · redaction
- middleware: correlation id · audit · rate limiting
- mail: the invite/recovery mailer seam
- server: the core DOOR — the resolution switch, the dispatch registry
(RegisterModule), the role gates, /setup · enroll/login · recovery flows,
the reserved `static` workflow, and the loopback-only bootstrap (D-025)
